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ABSTRACT 
 There is a widespread intuition that knowledge is more valuable than any of its 
subparts.  In the literature the need to show that this is the case is known as the secondary 
value problem.  In this paper I propose to defend this intuition by solving the secondary 
value problem.  In the first part of the paper I introduce and explain the problem I 
propose to solve.  In the second part of the paper I discuss two objections to the very 
possibility of solving the secondary value problem.  In parts three and four I attempt to 
solve the secondary value problem and respond to the two objections by setting forth a 
certain view of the nature of knowledge and the value of its subparts.  The conclusion the 
paper aims at is that each constituent part of knowledge has fundamental epistemic value, 
meaning that all the parts together are more valuable than any of the subparts – i.e. the 
whole is more valuable than any subset of the parts.         
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 There is a widespread intuition that knowledge is more valuable than any of its 
subparts.  In the literature the need to show that this is the case is known as the secondary 
value problem.  In this paper I propose to defend this intuition by solving the secondary 
value problem.  In the first part of the paper I introduce and explain the problem I 
propose to solve.  In the second part of the paper I discuss two objections to the very 
possibility of solving the secondary value problem.  In parts three and four I attempt to 
solve the secondary value problem and respond to the two objections by setting forth a 
certain view of the nature of knowledge and the value of its subparts.  The conclusion the 
paper aims at is that each constituent part of knowledge has fundamental epistemic value, 
meaning that all the parts together are more valuable than any of the subparts – i.e. the 
whole is more valuable than any subset of the parts.         
1. The Secondary Value Problem  
 In our epistemic pursuits we often betray an assumptive belief in the value of 
knowledge.  As Duncan Pritchard points out, this assumption best explains the focus on 
the concept of knowledge in recent epistemology1 as well as our seeming preference for 
knowledge over “other lesser epistemic standings.”2  To demonstrate our preference for 
knowledge over other lesser epistemic standings, consider which option you would prefer 
were you to be given a choice between knowledge that p and the lesser epistemic 
standing of mere true belief that p.  It is probably safe to say that most of us would pick 
                                                 
1 According to Duncan Pritchard, “Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value,” Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement 64 (2009): 19, “It is a widespread pre-theoretical intuition that knowledge is 
distinctively valuable.  If this were not so, then it would be simply mysterious why knowledge has been the 
focus of so much epistemological theorizing, rather than some other epistemic standing like justified true 
belief.  Given this fact, however, it is obviously important to a theory of knowledge that it is able to offer a 
good explanation of why we have this intuition.” 
 
2 Duncan Pritchard, “Recent Work on Epistemic Value,” American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2007): 86.   
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knowledge over mere true belief, which seems to indicate that most of us intuitively 
value knowledge more than its subparts.  Showing that knowledge is more valuable than 
any of its less-preferred subsets is known as the secondary value problem.3  Solving the 
secondary value problem is the task of this paper.     
 It is important to distinguish this problem from another in the neighborhood.  
Showing that knowledge is more valuable than any subset of its parts is not the same 
thing as showing that knowledge has a special kind of value that may or may not be had 
by its subparts.  Showing that knowledge has a special kind of value, or is distinctively 
valuable, can be thought of as the tertiary value problem.4  The secondary value problem 
is not equivalent to the tertiary value problem in that it is possible to solve the former 
with also solving the latter.  Let me give an example.  Something has final value only if it 
has at least some non-instrumental value – i.e. only if it is valued at least partly for its 
own sake.  Now it may be that knowledge is more valuable than any of its subparts but 
also that the value it possesses is only instrumental value relative to some further good.  
For example, it may be that knowledge is more valuable than its subparts because 
knowledge is more practically useful than its subparts.  If this could be shown it would 
solve the secondary value problem but not the tertiary value problem, for in this case 
knowledge would not be distinctively valuable in the sense of possessing the special kind 
of value known as final value.   
                                                 
3 Ibid., 86-87.   
 
4 The concept of a tertiary value problem comes from Duncan Pritchard, “The Value Problem for 
Knowledge,” in The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, 
and Adrian Haddock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), 3-4 typescript.  However, I owe the 
formulation of the problem given in this paper, which is slightly different than Pritchard’s, to Berit 
Brogaard.   
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 However, while it is possible to solve the secondary value problem without 
solving the tertiary value problem, the arguments given here for the resolution of the 
former also appear to resolve the latter.  The case for the value of knowledge made here 
will also support the intuition that knowledge has final value, intrinsic value, and 
epistemic value.  First, the arguments will show that we value knowledge for its own sake 
and thus that knowledge possesses final value.  Second, the arguments will also show that 
knowledge is valuable on account of its internal properties, or its non-relational 
properties.  External or relational properties are those properties a thing has in virtue of 
its relationship to something else.  The arguments given here support the intrinsic value 
of knowledge in that the properties on which the value of knowledge supervenes are 
internal.  It should be noted, however, that I am not arguing that knowledge has intrinsic 
value simply because it has final value or vice versa.  Something could be finally 
valuable without being intrinsically valuable in that its final value could supervene on its 
relational properties, as when we value an ancient relic because of its relationship to an 
important historical figure or event.5  Finally, the arguments here will support the idea 
that knowledge has epistemic value as opposed to, say, moral or practical value.   
 In order to show that knowledge is more valuable than its subparts one needs to 
show that each constituent part of knowledge has fundamental epistemic value, meaning 
that each subpart possesses non-instrumental value vis-à-vis the other subparts.  One 
subpart of knowledge has fundamental epistemic value if and only if its value is not 
completely derived from some other of knowledge’s subparts.  Non-fundamental 
                                                 
5 For a discussion of and argument for the distinction between final and intrinsic value see Wlodek 
Rabinowicz and Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen, “A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000): 33-51. 
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epistemic value is had by a subpart if that subpart’s value is wholly derived from some 
other epistemic good which is needed for knowledge.  If one subpart’s value is 
completely derived from another, then the former possesses only instrumental value 
relative to the latter – this is what is meant by non-fundamental epistemic value.  With 
Pritchard, we have to note the possibility that an epistemic good may have fundamental 
epistemic value without possessing final value all things considered.  As an example, 
Pritchard points out that it is possible that truth is fundamentally epistemically valuable in 
the sense that its value is not derived from some other epistemic good and yet lacks final 
value because it gets its value from its practical utility.6  Thus, truth may be non-
instrumentally valuable relative to other epistemic goods because it does not derive its 
value from any other epistemic goods, but its value may be instrumental relative to some 
further non-epistemic good.  I will parse this by saying that the subparts of knowledge 
must have fundamental epistemic value, or non-instrumental value relative to other 
epistemic goods necessary for knowledge.   
 But why must each part be fundamentally epistemically valuable?  The strategy is 
to show that each constituent part of knowledge is valuable such that all the parts together 
are more valuable than any subset of the parts – i.e. the whole is more valuable than any 
subset of the parts.  That is what is meant by saying that knowledge is more valuable than 
its subparts.  Now in order to do this it is necessary that each subpart possess fundamental 
epistemic value.  If some of the subparts possess only non-fundamental epistemic value 
vis-à-vis one or some of the others, then it is difficult to see how all of the parts together 
                                                 
6 Pritchard, “The Value Problem for Knowledge,” 7-8 typescript.  This paragraph is heavily indebted to 
Pritchard’s very helpful analysis.   
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could possess more value than those that have fundamental epistemic value.  Pritchard 
spells out the value principle at work here: “If the value of X is only instrumental value 
relative to a further good and that good is already present, then it can confer no additional 
value.”7  If this principle were false it would license what Alvin Goldman and Erick 
Olsson refer to as double-counting errors.  Goldman and Olsson nicely illustrate a 
“double-counting error” by means of an analogy in which the bank gives you a certificate 
after you deposit a lump of gold in a safety-deposit box.  The certificate’s value is 
parasitic or instrumental relative to the lump of gold, meaning that its value is wholly 
derived from the lump of gold.  It would be a mistake to think that one’s lump of gold is 
made more valuable by the simultaneous possession of the certificate.8  The application 
to knowledge is fairly straightforward.  For example, if knowledge has only two 
conditions, X and Y, and if X is only valuable because it leads to Y, then X and Y 
together are no more valuable than Y by itself.  Thus, each subpart of knowledge must 
have fundamental epistemic value.  The secondary value problem, then, boils down to 
that of showing that each constituent part of knowledge has fundamental epistemic value.   
2. Two Difficulties for Any Resolution of the Secondary Value Problem 
 In the literature there are at least two formidable difficulties posed for any attempt 
to solve the secondary value problem.  In that “benighted pre-Gettier era” it was 
commonly assumed that knowledge could be defined as justified true belief.9  In that day 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 10 typescript. 
 
8 Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson, “Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge,” in Epistemic Value, eds. 
Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), 7 
typescript.   
 
9 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 4.   
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and age the secondary value problem could have been solved simply by showing that true 
belief and justification both possess fundamental epistemic value – for then a justified 
true belief would have been more valuable than either a justified falsehood or an 
unjustified truth.  The first problem for any such resolution of the secondary value 
problem arises from the ubiquitous assumption that there is only one epistemic good that 
has fundamental epistemic value: truth.  This is a particular form of something Pritchard 
calls “epistemic value monism,” which is the view that there is only one fundamental 
epistemic good from which all other epistemic goods derive their value.10  For ease of 
exposition I will follow Goldman and Olsson and refer to that version of epistemic value 
monism which posits truth to be the only fundamental epistemic value as “veritism.”11  
Veritism renders the secondary value problem insoluble, for if all other epistemic goods 
necessary for knowledge derive their value solely from their connection to true belief, 
then true belief is not more valuable with these other epistemic goods than without them.  
If all other subparts of knowledge have only instrumental value relative to true belief 
(non-fundamental epistemic value), then they can confer no additional value on true 
belief.   
 Given veritism it follows that justification is valuable only because (or if) it is 
truth-conducive.  Thus, the value of justification is parasitic on the value of true belief in 
the sense that the value of justification is wholly derived from the value of true belief.  
But if the value of justification is wholly derived from the value of truth, then it is 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
10 Pritchard, “The Value Problem for Knowledge,” 9ff. typescript.   
 
11 Goldman and Olsson, “Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge,” 7 typescript.   
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difficult to see how justification can then add any extra value to the true belief which is 
the source of its own value.  To think otherwise would be to commit a double-counting 
error; it would be like supposing that one’s lump of gold is made more valuable by the 
simultaneous possession of the certificate.   Likewise, given the derivative nature of the 
value of justification, it would be a mistake to think that justification somehow adds 
value to the fundamental epistemic good of truth.  Since the value of justification is 
parasitic on the value of truth, we have no reason to value justified true belief over mere 
true belief.  Jonathan Kvanvig refers to this difficulty as the swamping problem – the 
value of truth simply swamps the value of justification on account of the derivative nature 
of the value possessed by the latter.12         
 The other difficulty stems from the fact that knowledge is no longer defined as 
justified true belief, which means that, even if we could overturn veritism and show that 
justification and true belief each have fundamental epistemic value, we would not have 
shown that full-blown knowledge is more valuable than its subparts.  Thanks to Edmund 
Gettier we now know that there are cases of justified true belief that do not count as 
knowledge.13  The central problem in Gettier cases is that, although one has a justification 
for one’s true belief, the explanation for why one has a true belief is put down to sheer 
luck rather than one’s justification.  A variation on a well-known example: the battery on 
                                                 
12See Jonathan Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 28-75.  A version of the swamping problem has been argued for 
independently of Kvanvig in Ward Jones, “Why Do We Value Knowledge?” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 34 (1997): 423-439.  Linda Zagzebski develops a version of the problem targeted specifically at 
reliabilist theories of justification in her “From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology,” in Knowledge, Belief, 
and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology, ed. Guy Axtell (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 
113-122 and “The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good,” Metaphilosophy 34 (2003): 12-28.  See also 
Pritchard, “The Value Problem for Knowledge,” 4-20 typescript.  
      
13 Edmund Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23 (1963): 121-123.   
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your clock runs out at 9am on Friday morning while you are at work.  On Saturday 
morning at 9am you happen to look at your dead clock and form the justified true belief 
that it is 9am.  You do not have knowledge, however, because your justified true belief is 
more a matter of luck than anything else – it is only accidentally true.  It would seem, 
then, that we need to add an anti-luck condition on knowledge, one that ensures that our 
justified true beliefs do not fall prey to the sort of luck at play in Gettier cases.     
 If this is correct, then justified true belief is insufficient for knowledge, meaning 
that a demonstration of its value fails to amount to a demonstration that knowledge is 
more valuable than all other lesser epistemic standings.  In other words, a demonstration 
of the fundamental epistemic value of justification and truth would show that one 
particular subset of knowledge – justified true belief – is more valuable than mere true 
belief.  But we are still left with the problem of showing why full-blown knowledge is 
more valuable than any subset of its parts.  Now, in addition to showing that justification 
and truth possess fundamental epistemic value, we will also have to show that the anti-
luck condition on knowledge has fundamental epistemic value.  Notice that the swamping 
problem only makes this second difficulty worse, for if truth is the only fundamental 
epistemic value, then the value possessed by satisfying the anti-luck condition is wholly 
derived from its connection to truth.  Kvanvig argues that this renders the secondary 
value problem insoluble, for there just does not seem to be any fundamental epistemic 
value had by satisfying the anti-luck condition.  His point is simply that we are unable to 
show why satisfaction of the anti-luck condition is valuable in its own right.14  But if we 
                                                 
14 See Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge, 108-39.  
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cannot do this, then we cannot show why knowledge is more valuable than any subset of 
its parts.  We should here note that one cannot argue that the conditions for knowledge 
are valuable because they lead to knowledge, for that presupposes the value of 
knowledge, which is precisely what needs to be demonstrated.  In trying to establish the 
value of knowledge by establishing the value of its parts we cannot establish the value of 
the parts by presupposing the value of knowledge.   
3. Solving the Secondary Value Problem 
 Unless one is prepared to identify knowledge with mere true belief it will be 
impossible to solve the secondary value problem without demonstrating that there are 
other  subparts of knowledge that possess fundamental epistemic value.  Of course, there 
may well be epistemic goods that are fundamentally epistemically valuable but that are 
not necessary for knowledge.  Showing this to be the case would not be insignificant but 
it would not help us much with the secondary value problem.  For example, say that 
understanding has fundamental epistemic value but is separate from and also not a 
condition on knowledge.  If this is the case then the secondary value problem remains, for 
we have still failed to show that each constituent part of knowledge has fundamental 
epistemic value.  Thus, what must be shown is that each subpart of knowledge has 
fundamental epistemic value.   I do so by laying out a general account of the nature of 
knowledge and the value of each of its subparts.15 
                                                 
15 Before proceeding I should pause to note that the way I have set up the problem of the value of 
knowledge is the way that it is typically set up in the literature.  This setup imposes certain constraints on 
any solution, such as the constraint that every part of knowledge have fundamental epistemic value.  For 
the purposes of this paper I am taking the typical setup and the constraints it imposes for granted.  
However, it is not clear that this setup and its constraints are correct.  For example, according to (a simple 
formulation of) the principle of organic unities, it is possible for the value of a whole to be unequal to the 
value of the sum of its parts.  If organic unities are at least possible, then it is at least possible that 
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 The lesson of Gettier cases is that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck.  
Of course, there are different kinds of luck, not all of which are incompatible with 
knowledge.  Sorting all of this out is important but not germane to my project here.  For 
the sake of convenience I will refer to the kind of luck incompatible with knowledge 
simply as epistemic luck.16   If an account of knowledge allows one to meet all of its 
conditions and yet still fall prey to epistemic luck, then it is deficient.  This is precisely 
what happened to the classical tripartite view of knowledge as justified true belief.  
Gettier cases show that it is possible to have an epistemically lucky justified true belief 
and hence that there is more to knowledge than justified true belief.  Because of this the 
classical tripartite definition of knowledge has been all but abandoned.   
 In the wake of Gettier three options seem to be available.  One option is to argue 
that there is a fourth condition on knowledge, one that, when added to justified true 
belief, eliminates the epistemic luck incompatible with knowledge.  Taking this option 
seems to lead to the problem brought forward by Kvanvig: that of showing that 
satisfaction of the anti-luck condition has fundamental epistemic value.  One the other 
hand, we need not add a fourth condition on knowledge.  Another option is to beef up the 
justification condition, such that one’s belief that p is not justified unless it is also 
                                                                                                                                                 
knowledge could have more value than the sum of the value of its parts or perhaps even less.  Such 
possibilities open the door for solutions to the secondary value problem other than that of showing that each 
part of knowledge has fundamental epistemic value.  This constraint only works if the principle of organic 
unities is false or perhaps has no application with regard to knowledge.  As I said, in this paper I do not 
take issue with the typical formulation of the value problem.  Here I will only note that, if the principle of 
organic unities does pose problems for the typical value problem setup, the argument in this paper could be 
recast as but one way in which it could be shown that knowledge is more valuable than its subparts.  For a 
defense of organic unities see Noah Lemos, “Organic Unities,” Journal of Ethics 2 (1998): 321-327.  
Thanks to Berit Brogaard, Eric Wiland, and John Greco for bringing these issues to my attention.       
  
16 See Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) for an illuminating 
discussion of epistemic luck.   
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“degettierized.”17  One problem with this option is that the term “justification” has an 
incredible amount of baggage, such that when one hears “justification” one automatically 
thinks of a particular theory of justification.  This seems to preclude debates about the 
nature of justification.  Another is that, owing to Getter and post-Gettier literature, 
philosophers have become used to the idea that justified true belief simply doesn’t add up 
to knowledge.  Thus, a proposal that knowledge just is justified true belief will fall on 
ears conditioned to reject it.  For these reasons, almost no one defines knowledge as 
justified true belief.  In attempting to uncover the nature of knowledge a third option has 
arisen, that of identifying knowledge with true belief plus some other condition, one that 
is not identical to justification and that is sufficiently strong so as to be incompatible with 
epistemic luck.     
 I will pursue the third option and, taking a cue from Alvin Plantinga, propose that 
we think of knowledge as warranted true belief.  According to Plantinga, warrant is “that 
… which together with truth makes the difference between knowledge and mere true 
belief…. It is that which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief.”18  In this sense 
warrant now takes the place previously occupied by justification as that which turns true 
belief into knowledge.  Warrant is stronger than justification in that it is taken to be 
incompatible with epistemic luck.  There may well be a may be a plurality of necessary 
conditions on warrant that are jointly sufficient for its attainment.  On the view of 
knowledge as warranted true belief whatever else is needed for knowledge other than true 
                                                 
17 For the term and the distinction see Matthias Steup, “The Analysis of Knowledge,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), ed. Edward Zalta, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#TWO. 
 
18 Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, 3.   
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belief will pertain to warrant.  In defining knowledge as warranted true belief, however, I 
in no way mean to endorse Plantinga’s own particular theory of warrant.19  The account 
of warrant and knowledge that I intend to lay down is much more general and could be 
adopted by a wide variety of philosophers who themselves disagree over the specific 
nature of the requirements for warrant.   
 Where I do intend to follow Plantinga is in placing multiple conditions on 
warrant.  Warrant, on my view, requires what John Greco calls objective fitness and 
subjective appropriateness.  This means that, in order to know that p, one’s belief that p 
must be objectively well formed as well as subjectively well formed.  Greco sometimes 
refers to these two epistemic desiderata as objective justification and subjective 
justification.20  In keeping with the broad and accommodating nature of my account of 
knowledge I do not intend to endorse any particular conception of objective fitness or 
subjective appropriateness.  Thus, two philosophers could agree on the necessity of 
objective fitness but disagree over what is required for it.  Likewise, two philosophers 
could agree on the necessity of subjective appropriateness but disagree over what is 
required for it.  However, I take it that no one would disagree that knowledge cannot be 
had unless one’s beliefs are objectively fit and subjectively appropriate.   
 A subjectively appropriate true belief that is not objectively well formed does not 
count as knowledge.  For example, I may form a true belief on the basis of unreliable 
                                                 
19 See Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 3-47. 
 
20 See John Greco, “Justification is Not Internal,” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, eds. Matthias 
Steup and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 257-70; “Knowledge as Credit for True Belief,” in 
Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, eds. Linda Zagzebski and Michael DePaul 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 111-134; Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of 
Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 164-203.  
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testimony in a way that is subjectively appropriate on account of the fact that I have good 
reasons to believe the testifier to be reliable.  Here I have subjectively appropriate true 
belief but not knowledge on account of the fact that my true belief was not objectively 
well formed.  But nor is an objectively fit true belief that is not subjectively appropriate a 
case of knowledge.  For example, if I form a true belief on the basis of reliable testimony 
in spite of the fact that I have good reasons to think the testifier is unreliable, then I do 
not have knowledge.  Here I have objectively fit true belief that is not knowledge on 
account of the fact that it is subjectively inappropriate.  It thus appears that objective fit 
and subjective appropriateness are both required for knowledge.  But since I am defining 
knowledge as warranted true belief I am placing these two requirements as conditions on 
warrant rather than as two separate conditions on knowledge itself.  They are conditions 
on knowledge only in an indirect sense in that warrant is required for knowledge and they 
are required for warrant.  We will see, however, that placing these requirements on 
warrant rather than on knowledge is not crucial to my resolution of the secondary value 
problem.  (More on this below.)           
 Recall that in order to solve the secondary value problem we need to show that 
each constituent part of knowledge has fundamental epistemic value.  On my conception 
of knowledge this means showing that warranted belief that p and true belief that p each 
have fundamental epistemic value.  It is widely conceded that true belief has fundamental 
epistemic value.  Indeed, this is so deeply embedded in the way that we think about 
matters epistemic as to give rise to the notion that it is the only fundamental epistemic 
value – veritism.  In this paper I will not discuss the fundamental epistemic value 
possessed by truth except to say that true belief is not the only epistemic good that has 
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fundamental epistemic value.  For purposes of this paper I will assume what is already 
widely conceded – that true belief has fundamental epistemic value.21  Thus, what 
remains to be shown is that warrant has fundamental epistemic value.  If it does, then it 
follows that warranted true belief will be more valuable than mere true belief and the 
secondary value problem will be solved. My argument is simply that warrant is 
fundamentally epistemically valuable on account of the fact that both of its own 
constituent parts – objective fitness and subjective appropriateness – are themselves 
fundamentally epistemically valuable.22  Technically, however, so long as one of these 
parts has fundamental epistemic value warrant will still have epistemic value.  Thus, in 
order to show that warrant does not have fundamental epistemic value it will have to be 
shown that the arguments for the fundamental value of both objective fitness and 
subjective appropriateness are fatally flawed. 
 Let’s start with objective fitness.  Presumably objective fitness is in the actual 
world truth-conducive and so has non-fundamental epistemic value in that it has 
instrumental value relative to truth – part of its value is derived from the value of truth.  It 
would be a mistake, however, to assume that, in addition to having non-fundamental 
epistemic value, objective fitness has absolutely no fundamental epistemic value.  In 
order to show that objective fitness has fundamental epistemic value we need to consider 
                                                 
21 For a sustained defense of the value of truth see Michael Lynch, True to Life: Why Truth Matters 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004). 
 
22 Kvanvig seems to endorse the viability of this strategy.  For example, in The Value of Knowledge, 112, 
he writes: “If we assume that there is some property like justification that distinguishes knowledge from 
true belief, then an adequate explanation of the value of knowledge could be achieved by giving an 
adequate account of the value of justification.”  My claim is simply that warrant distinguishes knowledge 
from true belief, and that warrant has fundamental epistemic value, thus rendering warranted true belief, or 
knowledge, more valuable than true belief.   
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two possible worlds in which everything is the same except for the fact that objective 
fitness is present in one but absent in the other and then consider whether or not we value 
the world with objective fitness more than the one without it.  The answer is that we do. 
 Consider two possible worlds, P1 and P2.  In P1 my beliefs are mostly true, 
subjectively appropriate, and reliably formed but fail to be objectively fit.  To borrow an 
example from Greco, say that in P1 a helpful demon arranges the world so that it 
conforms to my beliefs.23  In P2 my beliefs are mostly true, subjectively appropriate, and 
reliably formed; moreover, they are objectively fit.  Instead of being controlled by a 
demon, say that in P2 God designed my cognitive faculties and my cognitive 
environment to ensure that, in most cases, my beliefs are objectively well formed.  Now it 
seems that, from a purely epistemic point of view, I would value P2 over P1 even though 
my beliefs are mostly true in both worlds.  The reason seems to be that I value objective 
fit even when I “already” have true beliefs.  We value objectively forming our beliefs 
well.  Thus, I would rather have an objectively well formed false belief than an 
objectively ill-formed false belief.  I want to reason well and form my beliefs properly 
from an objective point of view even when I do not get the right result.  Objective fitness, 
then, has fundamental epistemic value.  But since objective fitness is one component of 
warrant, a warranted belief will necessarily be objectively fit and thus will possess 
fundamental epistemic value.  Thus, warranted true belief has more overall value than 
mere true belief.   
 Perhaps an example will help.  Take two epistemic agents, A and B.  A has a 
subjectively appropriate true belief in God that is also objectively fit, while B has a 
                                                 
23 Greco, Putting Skeptics in Their Place, 175. 
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subjectively appropriate true belief in God that is not objectively fit.  A believes in God 
solely on the basis of powerful and successful arguments from natural theology.  Let us 
further stipulate that A is not aware of any defeaters for his theistic belief.  B also 
believes in God on the basis of natural theological arguments and also is not aware of any 
defeaters.  The difference, however, is that the arguments for God’s existence upon which 
B’s theistic belief is based are logically fallacious, absolutely pathetic, and utterly fail to 
establish their conclusion, although B is unaware of this and mistakenly thinks that they 
are terrific and irresistible.  Clearly, we would say that A is in a better epistemic situation 
than B, that A’s doxastic state or position is more epistemically valuable than is B’s.  It 
does not matter that A and B both have subjectively appropriate true belief.  The verity of 
A’s belief in no way swamps the value of its objective fitness.      
 The fundamental epistemic value had by objective fitness takes care of the 
problem posed by the anti-luck condition.  Recall that Kvanvig argues that there is no 
hope of showing that knowledge is more valuable than its subparts on account of the fact 
that there is no hope of showing that satisfaction of the anti-luck condition has what we 
are calling fundamental epistemic value.  We can resolve this difficulty by noting that 
there is no objective fitness and hence no warrant when epistemic luck is present.  One’s 
belief that p is not objectively well formed when it is infected with epistemic luck.  It is 
highly counterintuitive to say that a belief is objectively fit but only luckily true.  In 
standard Gettier cases it seems that agents have subjectively appropriate true beliefs that 
fall short of knowledge on account of a lack of objective fitness, and this lack is due to 
epistemic luck.  On the view of knowledge and warrant I am advocating here it does not 
matter if satisfying the anti-luck condition fails to have fundamental epistemic value.  By 
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properly understanding the structure of knowledge and warrant we can see that this 
problem is actually a pseudo-problem.  The anti-luck condition is actually a necessary 
condition on objective fitness, which is itself a necessary condition on warrant.  It does 
not matter if the value had by satisfying the anti-luck condition is wholly derived from 
some other epistemic good, such as objective fitness or true belief.  This in no way 
undermines the fundamental epistemic value of objective fitness or warrant, which is 
what we need to show that warranted true belief is more valuable than mere true belief.   
 To show that subjective appropriateness has fundamental epistemic value we will 
pursue the same strategy we used with objective fitness.  We need to consider two 
possible worlds which are identical except for the fact that one has subjective 
appropriateness and the other does not.  Take two possible worlds, P3 and P4.  In P3 my 
beliefs are objectively fit and mostly true but subjectively inappropriate.  Say that I am 
intellectually irresponsible but, due to certain features of P3, nearly always reliably form 
true beliefs.  In P4 my beliefs are objectively fit, mostly true, and subjectively 
appropriate.  Surely P4 is a more valuable world than P3, even though I have the same 
proportion of true beliefs in each one.  In fact, even when my beliefs turn out false I still 
value subjective appropriateness.  If I did not care about subjective appropriateness there 
would be a real sense in which I would fail to care about being rational, which would 
itself be irrational (more on this in a moment).  So it seems as if subjective 
appropriateness also has fundamental epistemic value.  Thus, it seems as if warrant has 
fundamental epistemic value on account of the value of objective fit and subjective 
appropriateness.  If so, then warranted true belief would be more valuable than mere true 
belief.   
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 Let us turn to another example of two theists, C and D, to illustrate the value of 
subjective appropriateness.  C has an objectively fit true belief in God that is also 
subjectively appropriate.  C bases his theistic belief solely on powerful and successful 
theistic arguments that, so far as he knows, are not subject to defeat.  D, on the other 
hand, has an objectively fit true belief in God that fails to be subjectively appropriate.  D 
bases his belief in God on the same arguments as C.  The problem is that D recently read 
an atheological argument in a philosophy journal purporting to demonstrate that the 
arguments upon which D bases his theistic belief are severely flawed.  This atheological 
argument is in reality unsuccessful, but D mistakenly believes that it is successful.  
Because he is not intellectually virtuous, however, D keeps on believing in God on the 
basis of arguments he thinks have been defeated on the grounds that God just has to exist, 
so there must be some way to defeat the atheological defeaters, even though he hasn’t a 
clue how to answer the atheological charges.  Clearly, we would say that C is in a better 
epistemic situation than D, that C’s doxastic state or position is more valuable than D’s.  
The value of C’s true belief does not swamp the value of its subjective appropriateness.   
 To further support the fundamental epistemic value of subjective appropriateness 
note that there is an intimate connection between subjective appropriateness and 
rationality, namely, that rationality requires a due regard for subjective appropriateness.  
Now in saying that rationality requires due regard for subjective appropriateness, 
however, just exactly what is being said?  There are myriad views of rationality,24 so any 
attempt to say that a person or belief is rational will need to be specific about the concept 
                                                 
24 For a catalogue and discussion of various conceptions of rationality see Alvin Plantinga, Warranted 
Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 108-134. 
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in order to say anything very significant.  On the other hand, I do not want to go into a 
full-blown theory of rationality, so I will try to be as concise as possible.  Let us suppose 
that “rationality” is not just a synonym for “justification,” although of course there may 
be various similarities and relations between them.  As a corollary let us also say that 
rationality is not identical to objective or subjective justification.  Instead of giving an all-
out theory of rationality, I will proceed by identifying a particular kind of epistemic vice 
as an instance of irrationality.  This will suffice for my purposes here.   
 When your belief is subjectively appropriate it is subjectively well formed.  At 
least one thing that it means to have your belief subjectively well formed is that it is 
rational, meaning that, so far as you know, the way your belief was formed was not 
epistemically improper – no epistemic obligations were violated, no malfunction was at 
play, no potential defeaters were ignored, and so on.  A cognizer is rational, then, if he 
attempts to regulate his doxastic practices according to whether or not his beliefs are well 
formed so far as he can see.  A cognizer is irrational if he sees, or seems to see, that his 
beliefs are not well formed but continues to try and hold them anyway.  Such a person 
shows no regard for forming his beliefs properly, for his doxastic practices are not 
affected by situations in which it seems to him that his beliefs are not well formed.  By 
contrast, upon seeing or suspecting that his beliefs are not well formed, at least so far as 
he knows, a rational person will take the appropriate doxastic action and disbelieve or 
perhaps suspend belief pending further investigation – whatever exactly the appropriate 
action is, that is what he will do, or try to do.  The fact that we value subjective 
appropriateness can be seen by the fact that we think that being rational is good all by 
itself, meaning that we think it is good to regulate our doxastic activity according to 
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whether or not our beliefs are, as far as we can see, well formed.  A cognizer with an 
objectively fit true belief who mistakenly thinks that his belief is not well formed and yet 
persists in holding on, or trying to hold on, to this belief displays a deep form of 
irrationality that is disvaluable and that is incompatible with subjective appropriateness.  
So rationality has fundamental epistemic value and is necessary for subjective 
appropriateness, therefore subjective appropriateness has fundamental epistemic value.         
 The arguments given above in favor of the view that warrant (objective fit and 
subjective appropriateness) has fundamental epistemic value get added plausibility from 
considerations in ethics.  In order to perform a virtuous act an agent must do the right 
thing for the right reason.  Doing the wrong thing for the right reason does not count as 
virtuous, nor does doing the right thing for the wrong reason.  The right result must be 
gotten in the right way in order to be virtuous.  The act must be objectively justified in 
that it is the right thing to do and subjectively justified in that I think it is the right thing 
to do and do it for that reason.  Reflection seems to show that we value each of these 
components for their own sake.  Thus, I would prefer a possible world in which I do the 
right thing for the right reason to one in which I do the right thing for the wrong reason.  
But I would also prefer a world in which I do the wrong thing for the right reason to one 
in which I do the wrong thing for the wrong reason.  These considerations show that we 
value performing an action for the right reason for its own sake.  But I also value doing 
the right thing for its own sake.  Thus, I would rather do the right thing for the wrong 
reason than do the wrong thing for the right reason.  This shows that doing the right thing 
is also valued for its own sake.  But if each of these components is valued for its own 
sake, then surely they are more valuable together than apart.     
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 The analogy with knowledge is fairly straightforward.  In my cognitive endeavors 
I value getting the right result (truth) in the right way (warrant).  Most everyone agrees 
that truth has fundamental epistemic value, so there is a broad consensus that it is 
important to get the right result.  But it has not been sufficiently appreciated that we also 
value getting the right result in the right way.  Thus, even when we get the wrong result 
(falsehood) we still value proper belief formation (warrant).  Even when I miss the truth I 
want to conduct my cognitive affairs properly.  I want to have beliefs that are objectively 
well formed and subjectively well formed.  Thus, the value I place on warrant is not 
solely derived from its connection to truth.  Warrant is valued for its own sake, meaning 
that it has fundamental epistemic value, meaning that warranted true belief is more 
valuable than mere true belief.  When I have a true belief I have something valuable for I 
have gotten the right result.  But when I have knowledge I have something more valuable 
because I have gotten the right result in the right way.          
 In response to the thought experiments given above that purport to demonstrate 
the fundamental epistemic value of warrant, it might be objected that all I have shown is 
that we value warrant.  In other words, perhaps the only thing accomplished by the 
thought experiments is a repetition of our intuitions when what is actually needed is a 
demonstration that these intuitions are correct.  The fact that we prefer knowledge to its 
subparts does not necessarily mean that knowledge is more valuable than its subparts. 25  
By way of rebuttal it should be noted that this problem, if indeed it is a problem, would 
                                                 
25 This objection was brought to my attention by Berit Brogaard.  
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also plague attempts to demonstrate the fundamental epistemic value of other epistemic 
goods.  A couple of examples will be instructive on this point.   
 In his argument for the value of truth Kvanvig attempts to show that true belief is 
more valuable than empirically adequate belief by showing that we prefer empirically 
adequate true beliefs to empirically adequate false beliefs.  When pressed to give more of 
an account of the value of truth than this, Kvanvig retorts that the critic needs to give a 
reason for supposing that his intuition “is a misleading indicator of what is truly 
valuable…. In the absence of such reasons, I propose that the conclusion that truth is 
intrinsically valuable is the best explanation of the data before us.”26  Thus, in his account 
of the value of truth, Kvanvig assumes that a demonstration of our preference for truth 
over lesser epistemic standings is an adequate means of showing that truth has value.  
The second example comes from Pritchard.  In his discussion and evaluation of the idea 
that knowledge has value on account of the fact that it is a cognitive achievement, 
Pritchard argues that our preference for achievements is “strong evidence” for their final 
value.27  Now if this method suffices for a demonstration of the values of truth and 
cognitive achievements, then it ought to suffice for a demonstration of the value of 
warrant.  And if it will not work for warrant, then it will not work for truth or cognitive 
achievements.   
 If the arguments put forward for the fundamental epistemic value of warrant go 
through, then it has at least been shown that warrant is something we desire for its own 
sake.  This is not an insignificant finding.  On a wide variety of ethical and 
                                                 
26 Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge, 42.   
 
27 Duncan Pritchard, “Knowledge and Final Value,” in The Nature and Value of Knowledge, 29 typescript.  
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epistemological theories such a finding is substantial indeed.  If it is thought that we can 
confer value on something by having a certain kind of pro-attitude toward it, then by 
showing that we do have a pro-attitude toward warrant I have also shown that warrant 
does indeed have final value (because we desire it for its own sake).  On the other hand, if 
it is thought that things have value independently of our pro-attitudes, then our pro-
attitude toward warrant might well be taken as evidence for its final value, or perhaps as 
an intuition that grounds our knowledge of the final value of warrant.  The only way to 
rebut these considerations is to deny that our pro-attitude toward warrant has any ethical 
or epistemological import, which would be hard to swallow indeed.       
4. The Value of the Anti-Luck Condition 
 So far my resolution of the secondary value problem has proceeded on the 
assumption that knowledge is warranted true belief and that warrant has fundamental 
epistemic value on account of the fact that its constituent parts, objective fit and 
subjective appropriateness, have fundamental epistemic value.  If knowledge does indeed 
have this structure, as I think it does, then the problem posed by the anti-luck condition is 
nullified.  The fundamental epistemic value of warrant would not be compromised by the 
fact that satisfaction of the anti-luck condition lacks it because the value of warrant does 
not supervene on the value of the anti-luck condition.   
 We could further support the value of knowledge, however, if we could show that 
one need not accept the particular structure of knowledge outlined here in order to accept 
the value of knowledge.  For example, suppose one wants to place the anti-luck condition 
directly on knowledge rather than on some other epistemic good, such as warrant or 
justification.  Would it then be possible to answer Kvanvig’s challenge by showing that 
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satisfying the anti-luck condition does indeed have fundamental epistemic value?  I think 
so.  
 Pace Kvanvig, as a matter of fact it turns out that satisfying the anti-luck 
condition does have fundamental epistemic value and thus is not only valued on account 
of the fact that it is necessary for objective fitness and thus warrant.  The upshot here, as 
we’ve seen, is that those who want to place the anti-luck condition directly on knowledge 
rather than on objective fitness or warrant still have an able response to the challenge 
posed by Kvanvig.  I take it that when we have warranted true belief that p we have a 
belief, at least dispositionally, that our beliefs are objectively well formed.  Cognizers in 
standard Gettier cases have subjectively appropriate beliefs, but their beliefs lack 
objective fit on account of the serendipity.  Also, they have a false belief about the 
objective fitness of their belief.  It’s not just that their beliefs are not objectively fit, it’s 
also that they mistakenly believe that their beliefs are objectively fit, although through no 
fault of their own.  Thus, I would say they are deceived about their epistemic situation; 
they are duped about the kind of world they presently inhabit.  And I take it that such 
deception is undesirable and disvaluable.  We value worlds in which we are not deceived 
about our epistemic situation to worlds where we are.  A world in which our reliable true 
beliefs about, say, the external world are paired with true beliefs about the kind of world 
we live in is more valuable than one in which our reliable true beliefs about the external 
world are paired with false beliefs about the kind of world we live in.  This shows that 
correct beliefs about our epistemic situation are valuable even when we “already” have 
the truth.   
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 Now at first blush it might seem that this putative solution fails to overcome 
veritism on account of the fact that it is the value of true belief that is doing the work 
here: presumably we value not being deceived because it is incompatible with believing 
the truth.  This is true so far as it goes, yet it does not prevent satisfaction of the anti-luck 
condition from possessing fundamental epistemic value.  When one knows that p one also 
truly believes, at least dispositionally, that one’s belief is objectively well formed.  Thus, 
in a state of knowledge that p a knower has an extra true belief that is absent in Gettier 
situations – namely, a true belief regarding the objective fitness of his belief that p.  The 
value possessed by this true belief is not derived from the value of truly believing that p.  
It is valued independently, for its own sake, and thus when it is added to true belief that p 
a cognizer’s overall epistemic situation is more valuable than when a cognizer is 
deceived about the objective fitness of his belief that p.  To illustrate: no one would want 
to live in a world where a benevolent demon consistently arranges reality so as to fit our 
beliefs.  In such a world we reliably believe the truth but are radically deceived as to the 
objective fitness of our beliefs.   Here we think that our believings are a result of the facts 
when in truth the facts are a result of our believings.  Such a world would be less valuable 
than a world in which we are not so deceived.  Again, this seems to shows that correct 
beliefs about our epistemic situation are valuable even when we “already” have the 
truth.28  Thus, even if someone demurs with regard to my conception of the structure of 
                                                 
28 Of course, I do not mean to say that not being deceived is ultima facie valuable.  There certainly seem to 
be cases where one is better off being deceived, such as is often the case with children.  In such situations 
the good of not being deceived is outweighed by a higher good.  Analogously, presumably being wealthy is 
valuable, although if wealth would corrupt your character then it would be better for you to be non-wealthy 
– in the end you fail if you gain the world but lose your soul.  Having made the necessary qualifications, it 
still seems to me obvious that we put a premium (highly value) on not being deceived, including not being 
deceived about the epistemic merits of the epistemic situations in which we find ourselves.   
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knowledge and warrant and insists that the anti-luck condition pertains directly to 
knowledge, Kvanvig’s challenge has still been answered – satisfying the anti-luck 
condition has fundamental epistemic value on account of the fact that it entails having a 
true belief (at least dispositionally) about the epistemic merits of our epistemic situation.      
 Before leaving this section I should mention how my argument for the value of 
satisfying the anti-luck condition relates to similar proposals in the literature.  Berit 
Brogaard argues that, when one knows that p, one also knows that the evidence on which 
p is based is reliable.  This means that, when one has knowledge, one understands why 
one’s belief is warranted or justified – because it is based on reliable evidence.  This 
second order belief is what makes knowledge more valuable than lesser epistemic 
standings.29  The other proposal in the literature I have in mind is Ernest Sosa’s notion of 
reflective knowledge, which requires aptly believing that one’s belief is apt, or accurate 
(true) because of or through cognitive adroitness.  Reflective knowledge is distinct from 
animal knowledge in that the latter does not require a second order belief about the 
aptness of the first order belief.30  My proposal in this section is similar to both 
Brogaard’s and Sosa’s in that all three of us are proposing that cognizers frequently have 
second order beliefs – or metabeliefs – about the objective fitness of their first order 
beliefs.   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
29 Berit Brogaard, “Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge?” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 36 (2006): 335-354. 
 
30 Ernest Sosa, A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007).  Sosa says that “reflective knowledge … requires apt belief that he aptly believes” (32) and 
refers to the second order belief as a “meta-belief” (33). 
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 Unlike Sosa, however, Brogaard and I both maintain that this kind of second 
order belief is always present in cases of knowledge and make no distinction between 
animal and reflective knowledge.  Also, Sosa does not go on to highlight the significance 
of this second order belief for epistemic value.  For Sosa, what makes knowledge more 
valuable than its subparts is aptness, or believing the truth through an intellectual 
competency.  Sosa holds that such cognitive performances have as much fundamental 
epistemic value as do true beliefs.31  Now when one has reflective knowledge, one has 
apt belief that one aptly believes.  And it seems, although Sosa does not spell this out, 
that the value of the second order belief and the value of the first order belief both derive 
from the value of cognitive performances.  I do not go so far as to require or deny that 
aptness is needed for knowledge here because it is not needed to make the arguments of 
the paper go through.  On my account the value of the metabelief stems from its being 
true rather than from its being a cognitive achievement.  Of course, it is possible that it is 
valuable both because it is true and a cognitive achievement, although the latter proposal 
is no part of my argument here.   
 The second order belief that I attribute to knowers is in fact inspired by 
Brogaard’s account, although it is not identical to it.  Brogaard requires that knowers 
have a second order belief about the reliability of the evidence on which the first order 
belief is based.  I do not require that the second order belief at hand be specifically about 
the reliability of the evidence.  Rather, I require that knowers have a second order belief 
that their first order belief is objectively well formed.  This may not always take the form 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 87-88: “One part at least of the solution to the value problem lies in a point central to virtue 
epistemology: namely, that the value of apt belief is no less epistemically fundamental than that of true 
belief.” 
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of a belief that one’s evidence is reliable, although it is certainly plausible to maintain 
that second order beliefs frequently do take this form.  Objective fit should not be 
reduced to reliable evidence as it is possible to have an objectively well formed belief 
that is not based on evidence.  Of course, if evidentialism is true, then this is not 
possible.  I suggest a metabelief regarding objective fitness rather than reliable evidence 
because (1) I am skeptical that the metabelief in question always pertains to evidence in 
cases of knowledge and (2) I want to stay neutral, at least in this paper, between 
evidentialism and non-evidentialism.  
 Also, although Brogaard and I both highlight the significance of this second order 
belief for matters of epistemic value, we do so in somewhat different ways.  Brogaard 
holds that the extra value of knowledge comes from understanding why one’s beliefs are 
justified.  By contrast, my proposal that having a true second order belief about the 
objective fitness of one’s first order belief that p helps to make knowledge that p more 
valuable than mere true belief that p does not appeal to the value of understanding.  
Brogaard’s proposal is plausible and intriguing, although I do not want to endorse it or 
deny it at this point.  The relationship between knowledge and understanding is a tricky 
issue that I do not want tackle here.  For present purposes it is enough to note the 
similarities between my account and other prominent accounts of metabeliefs and their 
relevance for epistemic value.  I take it that this similarity gives added plausibility to the 
argument I am developing here.           
5. Concluding Thoughts 
 I said earlier that my solution to the secondary value problem would also solve the 
tertiary value problem.  It does so on account of the fact that we seem to value warrant 
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(objective fit and subjective appropriateness) for its own sake.  It’s not just that warrant 
has fundamental epistemic value but lacks final value all things considered because its 
value is derived from some non-epistemic good such as practical utility.  We value 
objective fitness and subjective appropriateness for their own sake, thus they possess 
final value.  This means that warrant possesses specifically epistemic value, for it is not 
valued because of its connection to another non-epistemic good.  Objective fitness and 
subjective appropriateness are epistemic goods that are fundamentally epistemically 
valued for their own sake.  We might say they have the following special kind of value – 
final epistemic value.  Finally, it also appears that warrant has intrinsic value in that we 
value it on account of its internal properties – objective fit and subjective appropriateness.  
Now if we assume that truth has final, epistemic, and intrinsic value, then we can put this 
together with the results reached here to reach the conclusion that knowledge has final, 
epistemic, and intrinsic value.     
 Nor does one have to subscribe to my view of knowledge as warranted true belief 
to accept my resolution of the secondary value problem.  Since objective fitness and 
subjective appropriateness are both fundamentally epistemically valuable goods that are 
ultimately necessary for knowledge, when it comes to solving the secondary value 
problem it is irrelevant where they are placed.  In order to reassert the secondary value 
problem it will have to be shown that there is some further necessary condition for 
knowledge that lacks fundamental epistemic value, thus rendering full-blown knowledge 
no more valuable than any of its subparts.  The problem is that it does not seem that there 
are any such conditions, for it seems that any epistemic good other than true belief which 
is necessary for knowledge will pertain to either objective fitness or subjective 
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appropriateness, and we have already seen that both of these have fundamental epistemic 
value.       
 Because I have not given any detailed account of the nature of objective fitness or 
subjective appropriateness (warrant) my resolution of the secondary value problem is not 
open to the criticism that I have misdiagnosed the nature of knowledge.  There are two 
ways to criticize someone’s argument for the value of knowledge.  First, it could be 
argued that one has not given a correct explication of the nature of knowledge.  Second, it 
could be argued that one has correctly identified all that is needed for knowledge but has 
failed to show that each subpart has fundamental epistemic value.  When Kvanvig argues 
that the justification and anti-luck conditions do not have what we are calling 
fundamental epistemic value he is making a criticism of the second sort.  The argument 
would be that perhaps knowledge really is justified true belief + the anti-luck condition 
but that not all of these subparts are valuable.  This sort of criticism has been met by 
identifying knowledge with warranted true belief and showing that warrant has 
fundamental epistemic value.   
 But the first sort of criticism is altogether avoided on account of the fact that I 
have not specified what it means for a belief to be objectively fit or subjectively 
appropriate.  So long as it is agreed that each of these are necessary for knowledge or 
warrant it cannot be argued that I have identified epistemic goods that actually do have 
fundamental epistemic value but are nevertheless not needed.  Thus, because my accounts 
of the nature of knowledge and warrant are general rather than specific, my resolution of 
the secondary value problem is less likely to be found wanting due to an error in my view 
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of the natures of knowledge and warrant.32  Unfortunately, this kind of criticism plagues 
other arguments for the value of knowledge currently at play in the literature.   
 One example is the argument that knowledge is valuable because it is a cognitive 
achievement – something for which we are responsible, for which deserve credit.33  This 
argument is open to the criticism that there are cases of knowledge without cognitive 
achievement.  Another example is the idea that knowledge is valuable because it entails 
having a true belief that one’s evidence is a reliable indication of the truth of one’s belief.  
Thus, knowledge entails understanding how our evidence makes our beliefs warranted 
and is valuable on account of the value of understanding.34  Again, the problem here is 
that this explanation of the value of knowledge is open to the charge that it has 
misidentified the nature of knowledge, and this due to the fact that we needn’t understand 
how our beliefs are warranted in order to have knowledge.  One more example.  It has 
been argued that when one has knowledge one is able to answer correctly certain 
questions about the target propositions against the background of contrastive propositions 
and, further, that knowledge is finally valuable because being able to answer a question is 
                                                 
32 Miranda Fricker, “The Value of Knowledge and the Test of Time,” Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Supplement 64 (2009): 124, makes a similar point: “The value problem seems to present itself to most who 
tackle it as a challenge and an opportunity to advance whatever particular epistemological theory they 
espouse…. This has two disadvantages: any proposed solution is hostage to epistemological fortune in that 
it stands or falls along with the particular analysis of knowledge that issues it; and it encourages players to 
look for the value of knowledge in something that distinguished their theory of knowledge from their 
competitors’ theories, when in fact the basic value of knowledge may be better explained by reference to 
something less epistemologically specific.” 
 
33 For various versions of and variations on this proposal see Zagzebski, “The Search for the Source of 
Epistemic Good”; Greco, “Knowledge as Credit for True Belief”; Wayne Riggs, “Reliability and the Value 
of Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2002): 79-96 and “Beyond Truth and 
Falsehood: The Real Value of Knowing that P,” Philosophical Studies 107 (2002): 87-108; and Sosa, A 
Virtue Epistemology, 70-91.  
 
34 For this proposal see Brogaard, “Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge?” 
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finally valuable.35  The downside of this proposal in terms of epistemic value is that, if 
knowledge is not the ability to answer a question, then we no longer have any explanation 
of the value of knowledge.   
 In all three of these cases what is going on is that an epistemic desideratum with 
fundamental epistemic value has been identified, but that it is not required for warrant or 
knowledge.  Any theory which specifies exactly what it means for a belief to be 
warranted will have to contend with the criticism that the nature of warrant or perhaps 
knowledge has been misidentified.  Of course, since we want an account of the nature of 
warrant and knowledge we should not allow such criticisms to prevent us from giving 
detailed accounts of these things.  But we do not need a detailed account of warrant to see 
that it has fundamental epistemic value.  Thus, even if we cannot agree on what is 
required for objective fitness we can still agree that it has fundamental epistemic value.  
And even if we cannot agree on what is required for subjective appropriateness we can 
still agree that it has fundamental epistemic value.  So long as it is seen that these are 
genuine requirements for warrant or knowledge and that they really do have fundamental 
epistemic value we need not reach unanimity on their nature.      
 
   
     
 
 
                                                 
35 This argument is made in Martijn Blaauw, “Epistemic Value, Achievements, and Questions,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (2008): 43-57. 
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